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BERKELEY ON THE WORK OF THE SIX DAYS
Lynn D. Cates

In the Three Dialogues, Hylas challenges Philonous to give a plausible
account of the mosaic account of creation in subjective idealistic terms.
Strangely, when faced with two alternative strategies, Berkeley chooses the
less viable option and explicates the mosaic account of creation in terms of
perceptibility. I shall show that Berkeley's account of creation trivializes the
affair, if it does not fail outright.

I.

In any account of creation, one must first consider whether orthodoxy
is important. If retaining orthodoxy is important, then that account is
faced with certain constraints. Two such constraints are the denial of the
doctrine of eternal creation, and the strong immutability thesis.
The doctrine of eternal creation is perhaps best characterized by the
following proposition:
(1) The created universe has always been in the act of being created, is now being created, and shall always be in the act of
being created.

Creation here is not to be confused with conservation or preservation.
These refer to God's retaining in being that which came to be at a specific time. Creation on the orthodox view is regarded as both ex nihilo and
as having a beginning in time. The orthodox Christian theist must either
reject (1) or else abandon orthodoxy.
The strong immutability thesis is this:
(2) There can be no change in God except in his relations to
creatures.
Hence, accepting (2), one cannot hold, for example, that God changes his
mind, or that there is a change in God's substance. One can, however,
hold (2) and allow that God is related to some creature, x, at time t, as,
say, judge-to-condemned-party; but, that at some l' > t, he is related to x
as, say, judge-to-acquitted-party. Such a change in relationship indicates
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no real change in God, substantial or mental.
(2) must not be confused with the weak immutability thesis:
(3) There can be no change in God except mental or in relations
to creatures.

(3), then, would allow God to change his mind and still be counted as
immutable, whereas (2) would not.
Does Berkeley deny (1) and accept (2)? Clearly he must insofar as he
wishes to remain orthodox. 1 So, in that case, the denial of (1) and the acceptance of (2) shall serve as parameters for Berkeley's account of creation.

II.

Berkeley, through Philonous, explains creation like this:
[I]f I had been present at the creation, I should have seen things
produced into being-that is become perceptible-in the order
prescribed by the sacred historian....When things are said to
begin or end their existence, we do not mean this with regard to
God, but His creatures. All objects are eternally known by God,
or, which is the same thing, have an eternal existence in His
mind: but when things, before imperceptible to creatures, are, by
a decree of God, perceptible to them, then are they said to begin
a relative existence, with respect to created minds. Upon reading
therefore the Mosaic account of the creation, I understand that
the several parts of the world became gradually perceivable to
finite spirits, endowed with proper faculties; so that, whoever
such were present, they were in truth perceived by them. 2
On this account, creation is the perceptibility of the archetypal ideas in
God's mind by finite spirits.
Given this account, Berkeley has two options. First, he can define
'perceptible' or 'perceivable' in this way:
Perceptible) =df. "Actually perceived by at least one finite spirit."
Here 'perceptible' collapses into 'perceived'. If Berkeley accepts this
definition, his account of creation faces no extraordinary problems, and
at one point, he suggests his accepting this definition as a possibility.
When challenged by Hylas that his account of creation commits
Philonous to hold that it is "impossible the creation of any inanimate
creatures should precede that of man,'" Berkeley wisely has Philonous
retort that, "created beings might begin to exist in the mind of other created intelligences, beside men.'" So, on this definition, creation would
amount to a sharing of the archetypal ideas in God's mind with created
finite spirits-in this case, angels-and their simultaneously actually
perceiving those ideas.
But Berkeley seems compelled to show that his creation account can
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succeed, even without such finite spirits. His argument suggests a second possible definition for perceptible:
Perceptible2 =df. Able to be perceived by at least one finite
spirit, even though there are no such existing."
/I

The trouble with 'perceptible/ is this. Berkeley holds that the archetypal ideas in God's mind are eternaI.S Hence, if these ideas are always
perceptible, then, given that Berkeley is thinking of creation in terms of
perceptibility, Berkeley must be committed to (1). But as we argued
above, the orthodox Christian theist must deny (1). Therefore, Berkeleyif he wishes to be orthodox-cannot allow eternal perceptibility.
Berkeley's problem, then, is this. He must hold:
(4) There was a time before the six days creation in which the
archetypal ideas were both unperceived and not perceptible.
(4), of course, must be understood in reference to finite spirits, not God.
Moreover, Berkeley must hold:
(5) After the work of the first day of creation, but before the
work of the sixth day (when finite spirits were created), the
archetypal ideas were unperceived but perceptible.
Finally he must hold:
(6) After the work of the sixth day of creation, archetypal ideas
were both perceived and perceptible.
Clearly, Berkeley must propose some criterion to account for the difference in the relationship of possible finite spirits to the archetypal
ideas at the points reflected in (5) and (6). (He cannot, however, propose
a change in the ideas themselves since to do so would entail a denial of
(2) and consequently an abandonment of orthodoxy.) It is easy to
account for the change reflected in (6)-finite spirits came to be. It is not
easy to account for the change reflected in (5).
A try which fails is to claim that (5) is reducible to:
(7) On the first day of creation, God began to think of the archetypal ideas.
(7) fails because it entails a denial of (2). It cannot be repaired by claiming that this "beginning to think" is the result of an eternal willing,
because even if that were to allow (2) to be saved, yet it would undermine the empiricist claim, made by Locke against the cartesian account
of innate ideas, that one cannot make sense of unthought ideas. Since
Berkeley wishes to defend empiricism, this will not do.
Another try that fails is to explicate (5) in terms of:
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(8) God, on the first day of creation, became willing to share the
archetypal ideas with finite spirits.
because, again, such would entail a denial of (2). Hence we must emend
(8) to:
(8') God eternally willed that, on the first day of creation, the
archetypal ideas should be shared with finite spirits.
(8') obviously fails since, by hypothesis, there were no finite spirits.
So we are driven to emend (8') to an account of the creation as:
(8")God eternally willed that, on the first day of creation, the
archetypal ideas should be shareable with finite spirits.
Clearly, to explicate creation in terms of (8") is to trivialize the whole
account of creation. To see why this is so, compare this account to both
the realist account of creation and the subjective idealist account of creation with finite spirits existing. On the realist account, God created
material objects. By hypothesis, such items require no perceivers in
order to exist. Hence, with or without finite spirits the mosaic narrative,
replete with the cataclysmic upheavals entailed by ex nihilo creation, is
preserved.
Similarly, the subjective idealist account of creation, with finite spirits
existing, preserves the profundity of the mosaic account, for finite spirits
are perceiving stars, trees, and rocks coming into existence.
On the other hand, creation in terms of (8") amounts to God's eternally willing that the archetypal ideas begin to have the property of standing in a possible but not actual relation (if, indeed, shareable can thus be
reasonably explicated-it is not clear to me that it can). But surely
unpacking creation in terms of a possible but unactual relation trivializes the mosaic account.
But worse follows if, as I suspect, shareable cannot thus be reasonably
explicated. In that case, Berkeley's account fails. His dilemma comes to
this. On the hypothesis that there were no finite spirits until day six, he
cannot hold that creation is a change in the relationship of the archetypal
ideas to finite spirits, because the other relatum is missing until day six.
Nor can Berkeley posit any real change in the archetypal ideas since to
do so entails denial of (2). Finally, Berkeley cannot allow for a change on
the part of non-existent perceivers. Yet there must be some characteristic
of the archetypal ideas whereby one distinguishes a shareable idea from
an idea which is not shareable. Unfortunately for Berkeley, it is not clear
what this characteristic might be.
Berkeley therefore must accept 'perceptible' in terms of perceptible l
and argue for finite spirits preceding the six days creation. But this is
easily done and poses no special problems."
Austin, TX
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NOTES

1. An interesting question is Why would Berkeley wish to be orthodox? Although the question is beyond the scope of this paper, I can say
he was orthodox. Indeed, his denominational preference-Church of
Ireland, in the Anglo-Catholic tradition-indicates his wish to be orthodox. Add to this his concern in writing the Principles of Human
Knowledge, namely to combat atheism, and his care in answering metaphysical questions about the mosaic account of creation in such a way as
to attempt to preserve the traditional account, and Berkeley comes off
looking extremely orthodox indeed.
2. George Berkeley, Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous in
Berkeley's philosophical writings ed. David M. Armstrong. (N.Y.:
Macmillan, 1965) p. 214.
3. Loc. cit.
4. Ibid., pp. 214 & 15.
5. Ibid., p. 217.
6. I would like to thank Dr. William Wainwright and two anonymous referees for valuable suggestions on this paper.

